| ---------------------------------------------------- COUNTRY REPORT OF IRAN (by Tahmineh Sistani) Contents I. Introduction .......................................................2 1. Economic Policy................................................3 1.1. Development policy approach........................3 1.2. Participation of government in economy..........4 1.3. Monetary and Fiscal Policy............................4 1.4. Social Issues....................................................5 2. Current Macroeconomic Situation....................................6 2.1. GDP (GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ) growth........6 2.2. Inflation................................................................... ......7 2.3. Unemployment..............................................................8 3. Economic Structure..........................................................8 3.1. Agriculture sector.........................................................10 3.2. Industry sector.............................................................11 3.2.1. Petrochemical industries........................................11 3.2.2. Mines and Metals Subdivision...............................13 3.3. Service sector......................14 3.3.1. Communication Systems............. 14 3.3.2. Transportation................... 14 3.3.3. Protection of Public Health............ 15 3.4. Areas/Branches of high importance/competitiveness...15 4. International Economic Relations................15 4.1. Foreign trade broken down by major regions........ 15 4.2. Foreign trade broken down by commodities........18 4.3. Foreign direct investment..................19 4.4. Participation in custom unions/free trade areas.......21 4.5. Foreign exchange policy..................21 4.5.1. Foreign Currency Transactions............22 5. Major Problems of Economy and Future Perspectives......23 6. Bibliography .........................24 ------------------------------------------------------------ I. Introduction For the representation of Iranian economic structure, we must first differentiate two developmental periods, i.e. a phase before 1979 Revolution and a phase after 1979. Before 1979, most of the largest companies of the world were represented in Iran. Despite the stable economy, Iran was exploited by these companies as a cheap developing country. Thus those companies either stopped or delayed development trend of the Iranian economy through their own development projects. If one looks into the western statistical data over the economy of Iran, it is reported that it was only the oil, Pistachios and carpets, which is quite primitive. After 1979, Iranian economy suffered enormous loss as a consequence of the retreat of the world companies. Then an eight-year war was forced upon Iran, which cost Iran 900 billion US Dollar. Afterwards the USA imposed restrictive economics on Iran because of the loss of supremacy in the Persian Gulf. After the war, Iran's economy began developing . Despite the economic isolation of Iran by the USA, Iran succeeded in developing enormous economic projects in modern motorways, airports, dams, hydraulic electrical power stations, nuclear power, rockets, satellites, submarines, shipbuilding, aircraft construction, combat aircraft, modern military technology, high-frequency engineering, micro technology, computer technology, automobile industry, town construction. Modernization of the infrastructure and improvement of school and university education, research establishments, medicine, pharmacy, agriculture, ecology, food technology, light goods industry, were in the foreground of new development trends. In the Iranian Bazaar, there is enormous capital which is unfortunately still today invested in traditional economy. That is however a big loss for the Iranian economy. With adequate investments of the Bazaar capitals one could initiate industrialization projects by which one could employ millions of people. Iran is a very rich country in raw materials, the natural gas and oil fields. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Economic Policy 1.1. Development policy approach In economies like Iranian economy, a variety of policies is adopted in the process of economic development and economic policy makers put more emphasis on one or two policies while implementing them simultaneously. In compiling the foreign exchange policies since the beginning of the First Five Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan, moving towards a single parity foreign exchange rate has been taken into consideration. Reducing the number of foreign exchange rates and moving within the framework of a three rate system (official, competitive and export rates) which started in the first plan with an aim of nearing the real rate of hard currencies, continued in the second plan. The reduction in the value of the national currency in the first plan led to a substantial increase in non-oil exports from one billion dollars in 1989 to 4.8 billion dollars in 1994 (the last year of the first plan)[1]. Liberalization of foreign trade and reduction of impediments to import of goods in that period left an favorable impact on activating the key manufacturing sectors particularly mining and industrial projects as well as some oil projects, increasing private sector investments in light industries and thus giving a boost to the production and exports in those industries although the import of luxury goods and foodstuffs increased in that period too. However, accumulation of foreign commitments as a result of using short term foreign financial resources (short term debts as a result of making use of usance facilities) and the problem arising from balance of foreign payment caused the foreign exchange policies envisioned in the first plan to be put into oblivion and foreign exchange limits to be imposed. The direct impact of enforcement of a fixed export rate (one dollar = 3000 Rials) and obliging exporters to undertake to return the hard currencies they gained from exports to the country, is quite obvious in the value of non-oil exports [2]. The value of Iranian non-oil exports stood around three billion dollars annually in the 1995-98, showing a 25 percent decline compared to that of 1994. Notwithstanding, the adoption of new policies to get rid of a fixed foreign exchange rate in the form of export proceeds certificate traded at the Tehran Stock Exchange and determination of hard currency rate on competitive market could help improve to some degree the trend of non-oil exports in the country though the policy of limiting and controlling imports still persists. The monetary value of Iranian imports dropped from the average 20 billion dollars per year during the First Development Plan to 14 billion dollars per annum during the Second Development Plan. It should however be noted that restriction on imports has affected access to modern technology as well as investments in the industrial sectors which require imports of machinery and equipment[3]. This is while in some of the years of the Second Development Plan like in the past year, the country's balance of payment faced deficit despite the fact that limitation on imports was in force, while the balance of payment had a surplus of 5.5 billion dollars in 1995, 7.4 billion dollars in 1996 and 4.2 billion dollars in 1997. Of course, the role of slump in the oil prices and over independence of the country's foreign exchange revenues on oil incomes in changing the trend of balance of payment, should not be forgotten[4]. 1.2. Participation of government in economy When the budget for the year 1998-99 was being drawn up, the export value of each barrel of oil was US$ 16 and the budget was based on this price. But the actual selling price of oil during that year fell far below this level. Consequently, and amendment was allowed by the Islamic consultative Assembly (parliament) to borrow the shortage, some 17,900 billion Rials, from the banking system, and to reduce state expenditures[5]. The decrease in government revenues meant that only 84% of the budget's foreseen expenditures could be met. The reduction in oil and gas prices lowered the ratio of the revenues from this sector to total government revenues, from 42% in 1997-98 to 31% in 1998-99. On the other hand tax revenues increased by 7.7%. During the year under review, public payments increased by 9.2% compared to the year before, up to 71,500 billion Rials. Current expenditures made up 75% and development expenditures 25% of total government expenditures[6]. The public budget deficit that year amounted to 22,880 billion Rials which equaled 7% of the GDP. About 51% of the deficit was borrowed from the Central Bank, and the rest came from advance sale of oil, foreign loans, government bonds etc[7]. 1.3. Monetary and Fiscal Policy The Iranian fiscal year begins on March 21 and runs through March 20 of the following calendar year. The budget, presented to the Majlis by the Planning and Budget Organization, consists of three sections: ordinary, plan, and defence allocations. Because of conflict between the Revolution's stated opposition to the massive defence expenditures of the shah and the high cost of the war with Iraq that began less than one year after the Revolution, as of late 1987 there had been no fiscal year in which defence expenditures were not severely understated for domestic political reasons. As a result, attempting to set forth actual figures on the money supply, especially as a function of fiscal policy, was almost pointless[8]. Tabelle 1. Government finances (IR bn; fiscal years starting Mar 21st): 1999 2000 Revenue 92,470 107,665 Oil & gas sales 25,955 20,125 Taxes 25,831 33,961 Other 40,683 53,580 Expenditure 93,161 111,336 Current 68,219 84,965 Capital 24,942 26,370 Balance -691 -3,671 Source: Bank Markazi. 1.4. Social Issues Although government programs have reduced the number of families with annual incomes below the officially defined poverty line from 47 percent in 1979 to 19 percent in 1996, poverty continues to be a major social problem. To lessen the impact of poverty, the government provides low-income families with various subsidies for food, fuel, and utilities. Health care services remain inadequate in rural areas. Another serious social problem is the widespread recreational use of illegal drugs, especially among young men, despite the government's heavy use of the print and broadcast media to educate the public about the harmful effects of addiction and drug-related crime. Education is free up to high school in Iran and over 85% of Iranian are educated. Recently a lot of private school and institutions established and offer good programs for rich people. There are a lot of qualified universities in Iran like Tehran University, which is public. And also there are private universities like Azad University that is very expensive and only the rich can offer it. It is not easy to go to the university in Iran since people have to pass the "Entrance exam" and it is hard. There are many people who want to go to the university but they could not pass the exam and they try each year! But the good point is, Iranian enjoys reading and they are knowledgeable not only about Iran, but also about the world. "Iran has a unique culture although it is mix culture. The ethic groups in Iran are Persian 51% Azari24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd7%, Arab3%, Lur2%, Baloch2%, and Turkaman2%. Iran is an Islamic republican, of its population 89% Shi`a Muslim, 10% Sunni Muslim, 10% Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and 1% Baha`i. Iranian's language is Farsi (58%) but also there are: Tukic and Turkic dialect 26%, Kurdish 9%, Luri 2% Balochi 1% Arabic 1% Turkish 1%, and other 2%. Total population of Iran is 72.1%, and 78.4% are male and 65.8% are female. At age 15 and older people can read and write. Iran uses their official language, Farsi in school and practices their Islamic laws. There is not freedom for minorities regarding their religion" 9. 2. Current Macroeconomic Situation 2.1. GDP (GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ) growth The gross domestic product (GDP) at the current prices of 1377 (March 1997 to March 1998) amounted to 327,600 trillion Rial registering an 18 percent increase over the previous year. This was while, the monetary value of GDP at the fixed prices in the same year stood at 15,445 billion Rial which was two percent more than a year before. Although no official statistics have been released for the year 1378 (from March 1998 to March 1999), according to the governor of the Central Bank of Iran, the GDP grew by 2.4 percent in 1378 compared to the previous year 10. Therefore, one can come to this conclusion that the GDP at fixed prices has amounted to 15,815 billion Rial. The limited growth of GDP in Iran despite the upward trend of oil revenues since the second quarter of last year indicates the existence of some infra structural shortcomings because economic growth for 1999 in the world has been estimated at 2.6 percent in the industrialized countries and at 3.2 percent in the developing countries 11. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has forecast a real GDP growth of 3.4 per cent in Iran this year rising to 4 per cent in 2001, higher than in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Its latest World Economic Outlook also expects the increase in consumer prices in Iran to decline from 16 per cent in 2000 to 13 per cent next year. The rebound in crude prices and increases in OPEC quotas have boosted economic activity and prospects for most oil-producing countries in the Middle East. The IMF projected that economic growth among oil-producing countries in the Persian Gulf to "turn positive in 2000 and remain so in 2001," due to stronger fiscal and external balances, improved confidence and greater domestic demand. It predicted that although GDP growth in Saudi Arabia of 3.5 per cent and Kuwait of 3.6 per cent would be slightly higher than Iran's 3.4 per cent increase this year, next year Iran's growth of 4 per cent would be much greater than the 2.9 per cent rate for Saudi Arabia and 2 per cent for Kuwait. Despite the improvement in growth prospects, its report referred to all three countries pressing ahead, albeit slowly, with structural reforms to boost the non-oil private sector. In the case of Iran, it said that although the external and fiscal positions had improved due to higher oil prices, "output growth remained constrained by structural distortions, and unemployment and inflation remain high." Promised reforms, being implemented at a cautious pace, were focused on "encouraging private sector investment as the primary source of growth and employment through more market-based exchange-rate and interest rate policies and by opening up to foreign investment" 12. 2.2. Inflation This paper examines the structure, causes and pattern of inflation in Iran. An econometric model of inflation composed of four simultaneous equations is developed and estimated for the sample period 1971-1991. The results suggest that the major causes of inflation in Iran are seigniorage due to the persistent government budget deficits, lack of fiscal and monetary disciplines, and adverse supply shocks. The pattern of inflation in Iran is consistent with the neoclassical theory of money and inflation. The results also show that the government credit control is neither an efficient allocative mechanism for financial resources nor an effective monetary policy instrument. These findings contradict the government's presumption that, within the present structure of the Islamic banking system, credit allocation can better help the economy achieve target rates of output, inflation and employment 13. Mohammad Baqer Nobakht, a leading member of the parliament committee that prepares the state budget, told the Tehran times that increased lending by banks to the government and the private sector had boosted liquidity, while an annual rise in fuel prices contributed to higher production costs. Nobakht said he estimated inflation would rise to 20 percent in the Iranian year that began on march 21, 1998, up from 17.3 percent in the previous year. He said psychological factors, which he called "inflation-prone mentality", also contributed to the expected rise in inflation, the English-language newspaper reported. Iran has in recent weeks launched a campaign against merchants who disregard state-controlled prices on food and other basic items, accusing them of "economic sabotage". President Mohammad Khatami has warned shopkeepers that the government would "severely confront" attempts to raise prices, after a public outcry over a flurry of price increases in the wake of the state fuel price rises of up to 50 percent this month. The government has in the past few years given top priority to fighting inflation after coming under attack in the press and parliament for not doing enough to curb rapid price rises. The official inflation rate was 23.2 percent in the Iranian year that started in march 1996, and 49.4 percent ayear earlier 14. 2.3. Unemployment The low level of investments, sharp drop in the government's development budget, the reluctance of the private sector to make productive investments and inclination towards commercial and middleman activities had negative impacts on the creation of new jobs so much so that the rate of unemployment for the period ending in Shahrivar 1998 (Aug. 23-Sept. 22) was put at 16 percent which registered a 22.5 percent rise compared with the previous year. Non-statistical observations point to the existence of extensive hidden unemployment in the country, suggesting that the real rate of unemployment in the country is much more than official statistics. The problem of unemployment and the need to contain its ever increasing growth rate is among the prime concerns of the government and this is why that according to the stipulation of the Third Five Year Economic Development Plan, the government has predicted creation of 750,000 new jobs in the country annually. To attain this goal, the country needs to achieve a 6 percent economic growth rate per year which in turn requires that the ratio of investment to the GDP be doubled, something whose possibility is very remote. The points mentioned above covered major problems facing the Iranian economy in 1378 (1999) and since it is of great importance to deal with other aspects of the issue, the following part of the article has been devoted to studies on conditions prevailing in various sectors of economy, physical aspects of economy, achievements and setbacks in 1999 15. 3. Economic Structure The economic status of Iran is compiles by the Plan & Budget Organization. Unfortunately the head of this organization has an executive job and also draws up the budget of the country. The result is an inaccurate measure of economic status of the country. According to this report per capita income of Iran is $700. By their calculation, the official statistics released by the United Nations and the World Bank, the per capita income of Afghanistan is 1,200 dollars and that of Bangladesh 1,800 dollars. How is it that per capita income in Iran is 700 dollars 16. Our main problem is that the Plan and Budget Organization is unable to calculate per capita income in our country. The reason for this is that the country's oil revenues were supposed to be put at the disposal of this organization so as to establish the country's economic infrastructures. This is because whenever the government plans to establish the country's industrial infrastructures, the private sector shows eagerness to make investments. But if the government wants to set up industries with petro-dollars this will cause disputes in the process of privatization because various factions will try to take possession of the economic rent. So, the head of the Plan and Budget Organization should not have an executive job and draw up the budget of the country. Rather, a person with very high scientific standing should be at the helm of the organization, capable of attracting all his forces around himself so that the organization can make the planning and offer it to the government. In that case, the cabinet minister can do whatever it should and if it fails to implement part of the planning, it will know where its social and economic expenses are 17. In the Iranian culture of economy, bazar (market), holds a key role in the daily interactions of a city. The people who make up this group of venders are not the most educated (formally) group of people. For the most part, their knowledge of commerce has been handed down to them thru fathers, uncles or alike form the previous generation. At the same time this group of people have enormous influence in political, legislative, and judicial powers governing the city, consequently the country. When this group is united for a common cause their power of persuasion is unmatched by any other factions. Individually, though, the alternative motives of doing business always shroud them in a sense of untruthfulness. Since their profit is their bottom line, wining over a customer to make a sale is the battle of the day 18. Although by passage of a 5 year plan, to privatize some government owned industries, some progress has been made, but still %80 of the industries in Iran are government owned and operated. The move to private sector has been very slow because of the guidelines explained below. Since a set system of tax collection on income is not in place, there is no concrete evidence regarding the net profit, or lack there of, of these industries. But collectively, according to the annual GDP reports, some have produced substantial profits in certain industries and not so in some others. To understand the philosophy of conducting business in Iran you have to understand how to maneuver around the obstacle course set forth. Present government of Iran imposes three tenets in implementing plans for economic development: "1- The plans must not contravene the constitution. 2- They must not violate Islamic law 3- They must lead to economic growth and prosperity. Despite the 'Economic adjustment act' of '89, to transfer large units of production to private sector entrepreneurs, the government retains control of key sectors such as banking, insurance, finance, air transport, trade and car manufacturing. Private sector if further hindered by number of obstacles: a- Lack of a genuine capital market. b- Lack of proper credit mechanisms. ( i.e. Foreign loans available only to government agencies) c- Most privileges and facilities are geared to state-affiliated bodies that directly compete with the private sector, which is left to fend on its own. d- Different executive organizations issue contradictory or opposing policies and regulations. e- The attitude of taxation agencies toward the private sector discourages production activities and income generation. f- Lack of a powerful executive organ that can implement privatization policies and transfer state holdings to the general public. g- Lack of security from prosecution. h- Red tape and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures for obtaining credit. i- Problematic & double standard regulations in all fields, from labor to production, sales, export, monetary and financial policies, social welfare, and others. j- Unstable regulatory environment, which has left economic units in a state hesitation and with an obscure future. For any investor in the private sector, assurance is of stability is an essence" 19. Governmental share of the economy is vastly and un-proportionally larger than the private sector. Currently, %80 of the unit based businesses are government owned and despite the fact that some businesses are privatized. If these units of production were productive to aid the economy the government would not have transferred them. It seems that the third article of economic implementation plan has not been implemented and has been overshadowed by the obstacle course. 3.1. Agriculture sector Iran enjoys great diversity of climate and terrain, allowing it to produce tobacco, green leaf tea and dried tea, along with more traditional staple cereals such as wheat and barley. Rice and sugar beet are also grown in substantial quantity. The Ministry of Agriculture co-ordinates production, but the main farm operator and goods processor is the Bonyad-e Mostazafan (Foundation of the Oppressed), which runs many of the private estates previously owned by the pre-revolutionary elite. Some 63m ha, or about two-fifths of Iran's total land area, is classed as cultivable land, but in 1998 only 18.8m ha were being farmed, a proportion that remained roughly constant throughout the 1990s. Agrarian reform was first initiated in Iran in 1962. Some 2m peasants benefited directly from the changes, which also sought to shift the emphasis away from traditional farms towards consolidated farms using modern management and technology. During the 1979 revolution the government gained access to some 630,000 ha of farmland which had belonged to around 5,300 major landlords who had fled the country. A further 800,000 ha of land has been seized and redistributed since the revolution. One-quarter of this is cultivable land, which has been made over to poor or landless land workers, but more than one-half is either uncultivable or poor quality grazing land. Despite pressure for further reform following the revolution, the Majlis' (parliament) attempts to set limits on the size of land holdings in order to benefit the small producer were rejected as unIslamic by the Council of Guardians. Subsequent attempts have all resulted in compromise, giving smallholders rights over lands which they had settled since the revolution, but allowing large landowners who had avoided the redistribution of land to retain their estates. The Council of uardians has yet to accept this approach. In 1990 the government introduced legislation permitting private investment in large farms under state control. Since then the government has made no further attempt at land redistribution and the lack of a comprehensive land reform agreement has been one of the principal constraints on agriculture20. The drought crisis in 1377-8 (1998-99) had extensive damage on the agriculture sector to an extent that the imports of barley, wheat and corn drastically rose, absorbing a large portion of the country's foreign exchange revenues. Given the amount of precipitation in 1378-79 (1999-2000) farming year, it seems that the drought crisis will persist this year. Initial estimation indicates heavy damage to wheat farms in Khuzestan, Sistan and Baluchestan and Kermanshah provinces. The only promising point in the agriculture sector was the inauguration of the first ever sugar cane plant in Khuzestan Province by President Mohammad Khatami during the Ten-Day Dawn period (February 1-11) marking the anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution. However, foreign exchange problems and shortage of financial resources have shrouded the largest sugar cane project with clouds of ambiguities and uncertainties. This requires the officials concerned to take serious measures to solve this problem 21. 3.2. Industry sector Industry has played a key role in the economic development of developing countries and this is why development policies have always been based on increasing industrial investments. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, administrative structure is such that the whole industry sector has not been put under a single category. The following is a review of various industrial sectors: 3.2.1. Petrochemical industries Petrochemical industries are among the industries which enjoy special advantages over other industries in oil rich countries including Iran. For this reason, the majority of oil rich countries have paid more attention to this industry and given investment priority to this sector. The Islamic Republic of Iran was unable to pay attention to this industry for nearly ten years as a result of problems arising from the war with Iraq. The end of the Iraq-Iran war (1980) provided this industry with an opportunity to absorb a great deal of investments to an extent that the monetary value of petrochemical products produced domestically now stands at 2.5 billion dollars of which 500 million dollars is exported. In other words, petrochemical industries account for one sixth of the country's total non-oil exports. The production of petrochemical plants in Iran now stands at 13 million tons per year which compared to the 40 million ton production of Saudi Arabia, seems a small figure. Since a new management took over the National Iranian Petrochemical Company, investments for development of petrochemical industries have increased so much so that in 1999 letters of credit were opened for implementation of some important plans for production of synthetic fibers and complex industrial polymers. The Table number two offers more details in this regard. It is noteworthy that simultaneous with implementation of these plans, projects such as a methanol plan on the Kharg Island with an annual capacity of 600,000 tons came on stream in January. The plant was partly financed by national bonds released and sold to the public for this purpose 22. An interesting point with regards to the petrochemical industries is that for the first time a public share-holding company named Petrochemical Industries Investment Company was established which now has 50,000 share holders. The company managed to receive a 30 million dollar loan from the Islamic Development Bank (affiliated to the Organization of the Islamic Conference) to implement a large project for production of P.E.T. a raw material used for production of disposable dishes which are now being imported to the country at high prices. This is considered very important in this industry and a prelude to future moves 23. Iran holds 90 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, or roughly 9% of the world's total. The vast majority of Iran's crude oil reserves are located in giant onshore fields in the Khuzestan region near the Iraqi border and Persian Gulf terminus. Current Iranian production is accounted for by the following fields: Ahwaz-Bangestan (250,000 bbl/d currently, with plans to increase to 600,000 bbl/d over the next 8 years at a cost of $2.5 billion), Marun, Gachsaran, Agha Jari, and Bibi Hakimeh. Most of Iran's crude oil is low in sulfur, with gravities in the 30°-39° API range. In February 2001, Iran produced just over 4 million bbl/d of oil, around 200,000 bbl/d above its average output of 3.8 million bbl/d for all of 2000. Iran's current sustainable production capacity is estimated at around 3.8 million bbl/d, which is around 250,000 bbl/d above Iran's latest (April 1, 2001) OPEC production quota of 3.55 million bbl/d. With consumption of about 1.2 million bbl/d, Iran currently is a net exporter of around 2.6 million bbl/d. Around half of Iran's oil exports go to Asian markets, with the remainder going to Europe and Africa 24. For 2001, Iran's oil export revenues are expected to reach $22.8 billion, down slightly from $23.6 billion in 2000, but up 121% from lows reached in 1998. Despite higher oil prices, Iran continues to face budgetary pressures, a rapidly growing, young population with limited job prospects and high levels of unemployment; heavy dependence on oil revenues; significant external debt (including a high proportion of short-term debt); high levels of poverty; expensive state subsidies on many basic goods; a large, inefficient public sector and state monopolies (bonyads, which control at least a quarter of the economy and constitutionally are answerable only to supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei); international isolation and sanctions. To cope with its economic problems, Iran's government has proposed a variety of privatization and other restructuring and diversification measures, although these remain politically contentious. Iran also has set up a "stabilization fund" for above-budget oil revenues, which amounted to billions of dollars in 2000 25. 3.2.2. Mines and Metals Subdivision The second section of the industries which enjoys relatively abundant advantages in Iran and which plays a key role in the structure of industrial production is the Mines and Metals Ministry subdivision. This subdivision includes such strategic industries as steel, aluminum and copper. Considerable achievements were not made in the production of such goods in 1999. The production of steel remained unchanged at 6.2 million tons which is far from the 10.5 million ton target predicted in the Second Five Year Development Plan. Nonetheless, a very fundamental incident took place in this industry last year which was unprecedented in its history and that was the signing of important contracts worth over one billion dollars for implementation of extension plans at Isfahan and Mobarakeh steel mills and for establishment of a plant which is unique in the Middle East for production of wide steel sheets. This is while that 25 years after the discovery of coal mines in Tabas in the northeastern Province of Khorassan, a contract was signed for purchase of equipment needed for extraction of coal from those mines. This will help put an end to the import of coal for steel industries in the future26. At the same time, a second hand steel mill was purchased from Bulgaria at a relatively low price. The executive affairs concerning this project will start soon. The only negative point in the development of steel industries in 1999 was the failure to sign a contract for establishment of Hormuzgan steel complex with an annual production capacity of 2 million tons. It is hoped that this project will bear fruit in the current Iranian calendar year (began March 2000). All projects and plans under way in the steel industries will raise the production of steel in the Islamic Republic of Iran to 15 million tons a year once they come on stream and this is considered a great achievement in this field. But due to an increase in domestic consumption, it is not possible to export a great deal of this product and this necessitates new plans for establishment of new steel mills in the southern parts of the country for export of this product abroad 27. In parallel with these measures taken so far, other plans for production of steel with high value added got under way which once operational within the next two years will make the country self-sufficient in production of color and galvanized tin-coated sheets and will enable it to export a portion of domestic production abroad. As for production of aluminum, no specific measure was taken despite the existence of abundant advantages in the country. The production of aluminum remained almost unchanged at 120,000 tons. Because of financial problems, the extension plans for Almahdi aluminum smelter got stuck 28. As for production of copper, the only copper smelter of the country in Sarcheshmeh, Kerman Province, managed to get close to its nominal capacity. With completion of copper producing plants in East Azarbaijan and Kerman provinces, the country's copper output is expected to double its present level in the next three years. The only setback observed in the mines and metals sector stemmed from the non-implementation of plans for production of graphite electrodes which is the main raw material for production of steel. This is while negotiations for signing a contract for production of ferrous chrome for the purpose of export failed. 3.3. Service sector Service industries account for about 50 percent of Iran's gross domestic product and employ about 46 percent of all workers. These industries include government agencies, hospitals, schools, and other institutions that supply important community services. Banks, insurance companies, restaurants, and many other business establishments also provide essential business, community, or personal services. Other service industries include trade, transportation, and communication. 3.3.1. Communication Systems In recent year through foreign contracts, Iran has improved wired communication and wireless communication in Iran. Unlike U.S. where you borrow the line from the service provider, in Iran you have to purchase the line. Though the country is advancing in methods of communication, there are pockets of areas without adequate means of communication. Numerous local radio stations are available, mainly on the AM dial, and 28 television station serves the country. The radio and television stations are government controlled and heavily censored. So the use of satellites are becoming widely popular. Numerous stations from all around the world could be received by these satellites therefore it is illegal to possess one. There is one internet service provider, though heavily censored, provides a link to the outside web 29. 3.3.2. Transportation Iran is equipped with air, land and sea transportation. 2 airlines, Aaseman and Homa, serve the interior needs of the country and the elder provides international flights. They are equipped with rotary and fixed wing aircraft. Though the aircraft fleet is aging they fly continuously among the interior airports. Railroad transport has deteriorated and is making comeback in recent years. The majority of the cities and villages are accessible by roads, paved and unpaved. The road transport has been maintained through the years and is still growing. Iran is equipped with sea transport and has number of seaports in the southern and recently northern Iran. Some ports are located on interior waterways and are accessible through the southern border. The country is also in possession of number of seagoing vessels to transport goods from different ports to international destinations30. 3.3.3. Protection of Public Health 2.8 Mimicking other more advanced countries, Iran is moving toward a centralized and regulated insurance and public health organization. Obstacles in achieving its goal consists of 31: · lack of professionals, only in quantity not quality, · up to date instrumentation consequently, · high cost of treatment. Although well trained physicians are available in Iran their quantity is limited and those available are usually in urban areas. Medical facilities are utilizing outdated instruments. The funds are available for these equipment however, the embargo imposed prevents other countries to sell equipment to Iran. The limited equipment available and the volume of patients to be treated drives up the cost of medical expense. This fact prevents some to seek medical treatment. In March of 2001 sale of medical equipment to Iran has been restored and a number of shipments have been made to Iran. 3.4. Areas/Branches of high importance/competitiveness Iran's major imports at present include steel, paper, wheat, machinery and capital goods, fertilizers and chemicals. In return Iran, besides oil and gas which it exports in large quantities, also offers the world markets dried fruits and nuts, dates, pistachios and raisins in particular; textiles, specially hand-made carpets which make up about half of Iran's non-oil exports; spices particularly saffron and cumin seeds; gum tragacanth; detergents; garments; shoes and leatherware; sulfur, zinc; construction stones; cement, lime and gypsum; and fresh fruits and vegetables32. 4. International Economic Relations 4.1. Foreign trade broken down by major regions According to the Public Relations Office of the Iranian Customs, the non-oil exports of Iran to the Central Asian countries also depicted a decrease in the tonnage exported. For the first three quarters of 1998 an aggregate of 621,000 tons of goods were exported to the aforementioned countries, while in 1999, the total tonnage of goods exported reached 571,000 tons in the first three quarters. The biggest fall in non-oil exports to Central Asian countries was in connection with Kazakhestan, which showed a fall of 7.43 percent. Based on the statistics released by the IRI Customs, the value of the Iranian non-oil exports to Kazakhestan for the first three quarters of 1998 was 24,544,000 dollars. The figure dropped to 13,668,000 dollars in 1999 for the same period. Turkeministan, with a total import of 80,354,000 dollars from Iran in the first three quarters of 1999 was by far the biggest customer of Iranian non-oil goods in Central Asia. Azerbyjan, Armenia, and Uzbekistan rank respectively after Turkeministan in this regard. The value of the Iranian exports to Azerbyjan Republic for the same period was 56,164,000 dollars. The figure shows a drop of 38,506,000 (?) dollars In comparison with the value of exports for the similar period in the year before last. Imports from Iran during the first three quarters of 1998 for Armenia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhistan and Georgia were 33,574,000 dollars, 32,033,000 dollars, 13,744,000 dollars, 13,668,000 dollars, 10,744,000 dollars and 4,612,000 dollars respectively. The IRI Customs statistics indicate that the imports of Iranian goods to Turkeministan, Armenia and Girgizistan were bolstered in the first three quarters of the last year in comparisson with the same in 1998. Regional experts, in their reference to the transit of 3-4 million dollars of consumer goods through Iran to the Central Asian countries and Georgia, regard the fall in these countries' imports from Iran considerable. According to these experts, instability in the foreign trade laws and regulations, inattention of the officials, major Iranian businessmen to the Central Asian countries and Georgia's markets and the absence of a suitable banking system to facilitate trade are among the main reasons for the slump in the non-oil export goods of Iran to the aforementioned countries 33. Tabelle 2. Iranian Exports to for the first three quarters of 1998 34: Country Weight/kg Value/$ 1. Azerbaijan 277991440 94670272 2. Turkmenistan 133362553 77073600 3. Uzbekistan 46352003 44544504 4. Armenia 85717090 30730866 5. Kazakhstan 39868874 24304086 6. Tajikistan 22211064 20769883 7. Kyrkyzstan 8102574 9715186 8. Gerogia 8250658 5635122 Total 621856256 307443519 Tabelle 3. Iranian Exports to the Central Asian Countries Central Asian countries for the first three three quarters of 1999 35: Country Weight/kg Value/$ 1. Turkmenistan 120583296 80354062/98 2. Azerbaijan 281724366 56164948/88 3. Armenia 72315148 33574265/58 4. Uzbekistan 44345652 32033843/65 5. Tajikistan 17684280 13744286/61 6. Kazakhstan 20828328 13668048/23 7. Kyrkyzstan 7360921 10744395/70 8. Gerogia 6531009 4612521/16 Total 571373000 244896373 Tabelle 4. Main trading partners (% of total) 35: 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Exports fob to: Japan 13.8 13.5 15.1 16.6 20.5 Italy 8.6 8.1 7.7 8.6 7.0 UAE 4.4 3.1 3.5 5.6 5.9 France 6.8 5.3 4.0 4.9 4.7 Imports cif from: Germany 14.7 11.8 12.8 11.8 11.0 Italy 4.6 5.7 6.3 7.8 8.3 China 1.9 1.6 3.7 5.6 6.1 Japan 5.9 5.7 6.5 7.5 5.3 Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 4.2. Foreign trade broken down by commodities The compositions of Iranian imports and exports in 2001 can be observated from the following five diagrams. The figures are taken from the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile 2001 of Iran: Tabelle 5. Foreign trade(US$ m; fob; fiscal years starting Mar 21st) 36: 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Merchandise exports 18,360 22,391 18,381 13,118 19,726 Oil & gas 15,103 19,271 15,471 9,933 16,270 % of total 82.3 86.1 84.2 75.7 82.5 Other 3,257 3,120 2,910 3,185 3,456 Merchandise imports -12,774 -14,989 -14,123 14,286 13,511 Trade balance 5,586 7,402 4,258 -1,168 6,215 Sources: Bank Markazi, Annual Review; Economic Trends. Tabelle 6. Exports of crude oil and products ('000 b/d; fiscal years starting Mar 21st) 37: 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Crude 2,290 2,441 2,342 2,300 2,079 Products 175 186 222 113 197 Source: Ministry of Oil. Tabelle 7. Main non-oil exports US$ m; fob; fiscal years starting Mar 21st) 38: 1998 1999 Agricultural & traditional goods 1,412.3 1,478.0 of which: fresh & dried fruit & nuts 591.9 517.3 carpets 570.1 691.2 leather 54.0 55.5 caviar 37.9 26.1 Metal ores 12.8 36.2 Industrial goods 1,588.2 1,847.7 of which: chemicals & petrochemicals 139.7 83.3 cast iron & steel 138.6 219.4 copper bar, sheet & wire 28.2 85.1 textiles 17.8 40.9 Total 3,013.3 3,361.9 Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Review. Tabelle 8. Main non-oil exports US$ m; fob; fiscal years starting Mar 21st)39: 1995 1996 1997 Agricultural & traditional goods 1,901.0 1,645.8 1,250.7 of which: fresh & dried fruit & nuts 580.0 639.2 337.5 carpets 981.1 642.5 635.7 leather 115.0 98.4 101.3 caviar 30.6 23.8 29.5 Metal ores 73.4 46.8 45.1 Industrial goods 1,276.3 1,413.1 1,579.8 of which: chemicals & petrochemicals 136.0 182.8 101.9 cast iron & steel 168.9 69.9 183.9 copper bar, sheet & wire 64.2 40.6 41.2 textiles 75.0 75.3 41.0 Total 3,250.7 3,105.7 2,875.6 Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Review. Tabelle 9. Main imports US$ m; cif; fiscal years starting Mar 21st)40: 1997 1998 Transport, vehicles, machinery & tools 5,045 6,348 Food & live animals 2,508 1,583 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 1,890 1,774 Raw, non-edible products 647 596 Mineral products 265 186 Beverages & tobacco 8 9 Total incl others 14,196 14,323 1994 1995 1996 Transport, vehicles, machinery & tools 5,525 3,656 4,205 Food & live animals 1,369 2,404 2,581 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 1,376 1,733 1,931 Raw, non-edible products 649 660 770 Mineral products 324 228 377 Beverages & tobacco 36 2 11 Total incl others 11,795 12,313 15,117 Sources: IMF, Recent Economic Developments; Bank Markazi, Annual Review. 4.3. Foreign direct investment The Iranian constitution prohibits the granting of petroleum rights on a concessionary basis or direct equity stake. However, the 1987 Petroleum Law permits the establishment of contracts between the Ministry of Petroleum, state companies and "local and foreign natural persons and legal entities." "Buyback" contracts, for instance, are arrangements in which the contractor funds all investments, receives remuneration from NIOC in the form of an allocated production share, then transfers operation of the field to NIOC after the contract is completed. This system has drawbacks for both sides: by offering a fixed rate of return, NIOC bears all the risk of low oil prices. If prices drop, NIOC has to sell more oil or gas to meet the compensation figure. At the same time, companies have no guarantee that they will be permitted to develop their discoveries, let alone operate them. U.S. law permits American companies to buy the bid packages ($10,000 each), but not to submit proposals. In late August 2000, Iran's deputy oil minister, Seyyed Mehdi Hoseyni, said that $8 billion worth of buyback contracts on various oil reservoirs would be finalized soon (an estimated $10 billion in buyback deals reportedly had been signed to that point). Projects include the following oilfields: Salman, Darkhovin, Sa'databad-Sarvestan, Cheshme-Kosh, Foruzan-Esfandiar, and Dehloran. Recently, Iran appears to have had some second thoughts about buybacks (including charges of corruption, insufficient benefits to Iran, and also worries that buybacks are attracting too little investment), and reportedly is considering substantial changes (or even abolition) of the system. Also, as of April 2001, no buyback contract had been signed for more than a year41. The first major project under the buyback investment scheme became operational in October 1998, when the offshore Sirri A oil field (operated by Total and Malaysia's Petronas) began production at 7,000 bbl/d (Sirri A currently is producing around 20,000 bbl/d). The neighboring Sirri E field began production in February 1999, with production at the two fields expected to reach 120,000 bbl/d 42. In April 1999, Iran awarded Canada's Bow Valley Energy, along with the former Elf Aquitaine (now TotalFinaElf), a buyback contract to develop the offshore Balal field. The field, which contains some 80 million barrels of reserves, will produce up to 40,000 bbl/d, possibly by late 2002. In February 2001, ENI acquired a 38.25% share in Balal from TotalFinaElf, which continues to hold a 46.75% stake in the field. Bow Valley holds a 15% share 43. In March 1999, France's Elf Aquitaine and Italy's ENI/Agip were awarded a $1-billion contract for a secondary recovery program at the offshore, 1.5 billion-barrel Doroud oil and gas field near Kharg Island. The program is intended to boost production from current levels of around 130,000 bbl/d to as high as 220,000 bbl/d within four years. As of December 2000, however, it appeared that tenders on the project had been delayed, in part due to changes in specifications for injection facilities 44. In November 2000, Norway's Statoil signed a series of agreements with NIOC to explore for oil in the Strait of Hormuz area. The two companies also will cooperate on developing a gas-to-liquid processing plant for four southern onshore fields, and possibly will develop the Salman offshore field at a cost of $850 million, with eventual production of 130,000 bbl/d 45. 4.4. Participation in custom unions/free trade areas Three port free-trade zones (Qeshm, Kish and Chah Bahar) have been operational since 1989, along with the Sarakhs zone on the border with Turkmenistan, which opened in May 1996. The free zones were designed to circumvent some of the restrictions on foreign ownership of companies and on trading regulations, in order to boost foreign involvement in the economy without forcing a confrontation with conservatives within the Majlis (parliament). A liberal investment code, adopted in 1993, governs the zones and includes 100% ownership of capital (although not of land), free repatriation of profit, a 15-year tax holiday and relaxed visa restrictions. The zones have failed to attract substantial foreign interest, however, and although many companies and banks have examined opportunities available, few have decided to pursue them. In part, this reflects the limits placed on companies operating in the free zones, but also the competition offered by better established and well-regarded equivalents elsewhere in the region, such as Jebel Ali in the UAE. Instead, the Iranian free zones have effectively become a conduit for much-needed imports from Dubai, rather than the powerhouse for non-oil Iranian exports the government envisioned. Officials have recognised the shortcomings of their strategy, and in 2000 began to work with a team of foreign advisers to determine what measures-if any-could be taken to restructure the zones. It is not yet clear what the government's new approach will be, but in a sign that the failure of the zones has been recognised and major changes are being considered, the heads of three of the free zones were all dismissed at the start of 200146. 4.5. Foreign exchange policy Exchange rate unification and the partial liberalisation of trade and exchange controls will make greater demands on the effectiveness of monetary policy. For example, monetary expansion may arise from the phased reduction in banks' reserve requirements. It will be important for the central bank to develop effective monetary instruments to sterilise the monetary impact of these reforms, and support the central bank's target for inflation. The issuance of CDs, together with the partial liberalisation of credit allocation, are all sensible and commendable steps. And I know that the central bank is actively considering additional possibilities. These measures will make for a financial system in Iran that is more efficient, liquid and transparent - and thereby more attractive to potential market entrants. Mr Chairman, economic progress in any one country is not just a question of that country's national interest, it is - in today's increasingly economically and financially integrated world - a matter of collective, international, interest. That is true both at the macro- and at the micro-economic level - the level of individual businesses and firms. That's why I think it is important that we encourage the forces working for reform and liberalisation by engaging constructively with them. Iran has embarked upon an ambitious, but realistically measured, programme of reform and liberalisation through the Third Five-Year Development Plan, and it is taking advantage of the present more favourable conditions in the world economy to advance that programme. I wish you, Governor Nourbakhsh, and the authorities in Iran all possible success in achieving your objectives in the interests of the Iranian people and in the interest of us all 47. Iran's unit of currency is the rial. The official exchange rate averaged 1,752 rials to the U.S. dollar in 1998. However, rials are exchanged on the unofficial market at a rate as much as four times higher. In 1979 the government nationalized all private banks and announced the establishment of a banking system whereby, in accordance with Islamic law, interest on loans was replaced with handling fees; the system went into effect in the mid-1980s. The banking system consists of the central bank, which issues currency; eight commercial banks that are headquartered in Tehran but have branches throughout the country; two development banks; and a housing bank that specializes in home mortgages. The Tehran Stock Exchange trades the shares of more than 400 registered companies. 4.5.1. Foreign Currency Transactions Iran's official currency is called Rial. Rial has steadily lost its value in the international markets since the revolution. Compared with dollar pre revolution prices were $1 to 70 Rial. In today's market $1 is equal to 8,000+ Rial. The government rate for trade is different. In the year 2000 commercial exchange rate was $1 to 1,760 Rials. This official rate is used for imports of essential goods and services and oil exports. For non essential goods and services and non oil related exchanges the rate is $1 to 3,000 Rials. All foreign currencies are converted to Rial before any transactions can take place. Foreign currencies saved in banks are converted to Rial and at the time of withdraw it can be converted to the foreign currency of choice with the current exchange rate. Since this is act a sure loss of capital, there is very little foreign capital kept in the banks 48. 5. Major Problems of Economy and Future Perspectives The Iranian economy has big problems despite its many current projects. The internal factors of this situation are related to the one-sided dependency of the country on the natural gas and oil export. The enormous Bazaar capital is not invested in the area of the modern technology. This type of profiteering shows no special economic efficiency and functions but only the maximization of the profit rate of the Bazaari investors. What is missing in today's Iran, is a coordination of the economy, science and technology in the total social context. This urgent co-ordination would be a requirement of the hour if one wants to offer 36 million young people a meaningful occupation, social security and a general satisfaction. For now, the government and economy present no more real alternative to these enormous resources. The tremendous economic capacity of Iran is concentrated only in the hands of the conservatives who on the one hand fear an economic opening towards the US and on the other hand wants to pursue anti- USA politics. This attitude of the conservatives harms the Iranian economy and its reputation regarding the economic sector. Therefore, the foreign investors do not feel enough confidence in order to invest in Iran. For the production growth of the Iranian economy, it is also an urgent task for the government to change its rigid national policies in favour of the privatisation of many domestic economic sectors so that new occupational opportunities and effective production sectors can result. A prognosis of future perspectives in the Iranian economy is very difficult, as it implies skepticism regarding the political, economic and legal issues as well as the inter-related internal security and foreign policy of the country. To implement alternatives in the future economy, a change of the political structure of the State and the participation of all the opposition forces in the economic sectors and policies are urgently necessary. With its present linear economic policy, Iran will not succeed in guaranteeing general satisfaction and social security for all. The future perspectives of the Iranian economy are thus uncertain. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] Commercial Review; Economic (Monthly): Jan. 2000, No. 147, P. 24-26. [2] Commercial Review; Economic (Monthly): Jan. 2000, No. 147, P.27. [3] Commercial Review; Economic (Monthly): Jan. 2000, No. 147, P. 28. [4] Commercial Review; Economic (Monthly): Jan. 2000, No. 147, P.29. [5] Iran Exports and Imports: Jan. - Feb. 2000, No. 61,By: IE and I Research Department,Pages: 44 - 45 . [6] Iran Exports and Imports: Jan. - Feb. 2000, No. 61,By: IE and I Research Department,Pages: 46 . [7] Iran Exports and Imports: Jan. - Feb. 2000, No. 61,By: IE and I Research Department,Pages: 47 . [8] http://www.cyberiran.com/history/monetary.shtml. 9 http//www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html. 10 http//www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html. 11 Tazehay-e Eqtesad [Latest Economic News]; (Monthly): Scientific, Economic, Banking Magazine, June 2000, No. 89, Pages: 39 - 45 . 12 http://www.neda.net/iran-wpd 13 http://www.cba.uni.edu/economics 14 http://www.neda.net/iran-wpd 15 Effects of economic adjustment plan on status of Iranian workers. Sponsor: Farhang-e Touse'e, Jun. - July 1998, No.s 34 & 35 By: Maryam Mohseni -New government and economic strategy, Sponsor: Salaam; May 31, 1998, By: Mohsen Shamshiri 16 Tadbir; Scientific & Educational Magazine (Monthly) Oct. 1998, No. 87, Prospects of Iranian Macro Economic Variables in International Relations, By: Dr. Rahim Rahimzadeh Oskoie. 17 Tabdir: ibid. 18 http://www.netiran.com/business.html) :Obstacles to private sector activities. By: Dr. Amir Houshang Amini. 19ibid . 20 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2001, P. 28-29. 21 Tadbir; Scientific & Educational Magazine (Monthly) 1999, No. 96, Prospects of Iranian Macro Economic Variables in International Relations, By: Dr. Rahim Rahimzadeh Oskoie. 22 Iran-e Farda, September 97, No. 36, Vol. 6, Performance of Macro Economic Indexes in Iran, By: Morteza Alviri. 23 Iran-e farad: ibid 24 http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.html 25 ibid. 26 Payam-e Emruz; Economic, Social, Cultural (Monthly), February 2001, No. 23, Iranian Economy in Six Snapshots, By: Ali Farahbakhsh . 27 ibid. 28ibid. 29 Abrare Eqtesadi (Morning Daily), Sunday Nov. 13, 1999, No. 420, Tehran Tower, Fourth Tallest Tower in the World By: Pouyan Hashemi. 30 http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html. CIA world fact book. 31 http://www.netiran.com/health. 32 http://www.netiran.com/Htdocs/Clippings/DEconomy/930614XXDE01.htmlWord 33 Abrare Eqtesadi (Morning Daily, Apr. 12, 2000, No. 531, Page: 1 34 Abrare Eqtesadi (Morning Daily),Apr. 12, 2000, No. 531, Page: 1 35 ibid 35 The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Profile of Iran, Page 58. From: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 36 The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Profile of Iran, Page 58. From: Bank Markazi, Annual Review; Economic Trends. 37 The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Profile of Iran, Page 58. From: Ministry of Oil. 38 The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Profile of Iran, Page 59. From: Bank Markazi, Annual Review. 39 ibid 40 The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Profile of Iran, Page 59. From: IMF, Recent Economic Developments; Bank Markazi, Annual Review. 41 Ettela`at (Afternoon Daily), Nov 29, 2000, No. 22072, Summary of Findings of A Statistical Project on Iranian Families' Income and Expenditure. 42 Ettela`at (Afternoon Daily), Nov 29, 2000, No. 22072, Summary of Findings of A Statistical Project on Iranian Families' Income and Expenditure 43 http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.html 44 ibid 45 ibid 46 The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Profile of Iran, Pages 38-39. 47 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk 48 Abrar, (Morning Daily), President of Iran's Association of Economists Saturday June 17, 1995, Stabilization of the Foreign Currency Rate and Its Impacts, By: Dr. Manuchehr Farhang. Payam-e Emruz; Economic, Social, Cultural (Monthly), February 2001, No. 23, Iranian Economy in Six Snapshots, By: Ali Farahbakhsh.
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